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for The Kurzet Family Trust;
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BRIEF OF APPELLEE BAILEY-ALLEN COMPANY, INC.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellee Bailey-Allen Company, Inc. ("Bailey-Allen")
responds to this appeal by Appellants (collectively referred to as
"Kurzet") from a decision by the Third Judicial District Court of
Summit County, State of Utah.

The Third Judicial District Court

(the "trial court") ruled in favor of Bailey-Allen on the issue of
partial entitlement to damages and the issues of prejudgment and
post-judgment interest.

The trial court ruled in favor of Kurzet

on the issues of Bailey-Allen7s breach of the contract and damage

bjn\4188
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offsets. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1992).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following statutes and rules are determinative in
this action:
Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2(3) (1993) , Contractors' Bonds, Private
Contracts:
Failure of
Liability.
(3) In an
bond,
the
attorneys'
These fees
action.

owner to obtain payment bond

—

action for failure to obtain a
court may
award
reasonable
fees to the prevailing party.
shall be taxed as costs in the

Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (1993), Mechanics' Liens:
Attorneys' fees•
In any action brought to enforce any lien
under this chapter the successful party shall
be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys'
fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be
taxed as costs in the action.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(e):
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the
judgment.
The clerk must include in any
judgment signed by him any interest on the
verdict or decision from the time it was
rendered, and the costs, if the same have been
taxed or ascertained. The clerk must, within
two days after the costs have been taxed or
ascertained, in any case where not included in
the judgment, insert the amount thereof in a
blank left in the judgment for that purpose,
and make a similar notation thereof in the
bjn\4188
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register
docket.

of

actions

and

in

the

judgment

Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-504(1):
Written orders, judgments and decrees.
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for
the party or parties obtaining the ruling
shall within fifteen days, or within a shorter
time as the court may direct, file with the
court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in
conformity with the ruling.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE.
Bailey-Allen brought this action against Kurzet seeking

to recover payment under contract for services it rendered as the
general contractor for Kurzet's home.
Kurzet appeals from the judgment of the trial court,
seeking to overrule the trial court's award of damages to BaileyAllen.
II.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
Bailey-Allen filed this action on or about December 5,

1990, and Kurzet filed an Answer and Counterclaim on January 30,
1991.

After three days of trial, the trial court ruled that

Bailey-Allen was entitled to compensation of $10,000 for the
services it rendered as general contractor, along with $5,500,
representing the value of a benefit to Kurzet in the savings on
bjn\4188
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lumber costs.

However, the court offset these awards with some

minor damage awards to Kurzet,
Kurzet filed this appeal to the trial court's decision on
February 12, 1993.
III. STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL RELEVANT FACTS
In addition to those facts set forth in Kurzet's brief,
Bailey-Allen submits the following additional relevant facts:
1.

Kurzet sought to build a 14,207 square foot home in

Park City, Utah (R. at 494) , with an estimated construction cost of
$1,000,000

(R. at

302, p.

70).

Kurzet

was

financing

the

construction on his own, without the necessity of any construction
loan or long-term financing.
2.

(R. at 302, p. 93.)

Kurzet sought out the services of Bailey-Allen to

act as general contractor of construction because Kurzet liked the
construction and progress of another home in the area built by
Bailey-Allen.
3.

(R. 498.)
After initial negotiations with Bailey-Allen, Kurzet

decided to use Bailey-Allen as the general contractor of the home.
(R. at 302, p. 23.)

The agreed price for Bailey-Alleys services

as general contractor was the sum of $100,000.
Agreement.)

bjn\4188
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(R. at 009, the

4.

The written construction contract governing the

transaction was drafted by Kurzet without the benefit or assistance
of a lawyer.

(R. at 302, pp. 19-20.)

5.

The construction contract contained no provisions

relating to remedies in case of default by either party, nor any
provisions requiring any certain number of hours on the project by
Bailey-Allen.
6.

(R. at 302, pp. 20-21.)
Kurzet was generally happy with the progress of

construction of the home during the time Bailey-Allen was on the
job.

(R. at 608-11.) At the time of Bailey-Allen's termination as

general contractor, the home was framed and the roof was partially
completed.

(R. at 677.)
7.

The major reason for terminating Bailey-Allen's

services as general contractor was the failure of Bailey-Allen to
provide a certificate of insurance within the time required by
Kurzet.

(R. at 217.)

Bailey-Allen did supply a certificate of

insurance within hours of their termination, but Kurzet did not
choose to accept the same.
8.

(R. at 606-07.)

After three months of work under the contract by

Bailey-Allen, the Kurzet home had been framed, the roof was
partially finished (R. at 677) , and the work under the contract was
ten percent (10%) complete (R. at 215).

bjn\4188
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9.

At trial, Kurzet offered no evidence of any damages

suffered because of the failure to supply proof of insurance.
at 535, pp. 16-17.)

(R.

Likewise, Kurzet offered no evidence of any

general damages whatsoever, offering only for some minor offsets
claimed for faulty construction.

The trial court accepted such

offsets and deducted the same from amounts otherwise owed to
Bailey-Allen.

(R. at 218-19.)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Contrary
confused

and

to Kurzet's argument that the trial court

inappropriately

mixed

"contract"

and

"unjust

enrichment" remedies, the trial court was not confused and did not
misapply the law or err in its damage awards.
The contract between Kurzet and Bailey-Allen, which was
drafted by Kurzet, was ambiguous and incomplete, lacking any
provisions for default or forfeiture.

In spite of this, the trial

court found that there was an enforceable contract, but that it
needed to be interpreted and added upon.

Based on the contract,

the trial court merely awarded to Bailey-Allen the compensation
earned by Bailey-Allen as general contractor for the three-month
period prior to the time the contract was terminated.
In addition, the trial court used the theory of unjust
enrichment to award Bailey-Allen $5,500, which sum was the value of
bjn\4188
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a benefit conferred upon Kurzet by Bailey-Allen regarding a savings
on the cost of lumber.
Kurzet argues that because Bailey-Allen breached the
contract, Bailey-Allen is prevented from being paid for its prebreach services.

However, Kurzet offered no evidence of general

damages arising from the breach (other than a few minor offsets for
faulty construction, which were accepted by the trial court).
Kurzet argues that the trial court erred in refusing to
award him attorney's fees in connection with the dismissal of
Bailey-Allen's claims regarding a mechanic's lien and failure to
post a contractor's bond.

Under Utah law, a court has great

discretion in awarding attorney's fees.

Further, Kurzet's claim

for attorney's fees combined three causes of action, only two of
which were ultimately dismissed. Because Kurzet made no attempt to
distinguish between the fees for each separate cause of action, the
trial could was unable to separate the fees and, after deferring
the decision, used its discretion in refusing the award.
Kurzet argues that the trial court erred in awarding
Bailey-Allen prejudgment interest. In order to receive the benefit
of its contractual rights to payment, Bailey-Allen deserves an
award of prejudgment interest, and the trial court properly awarded
such interest.

The amount owing to Bailey-Allen was liquidated at

the time of termination of the contract.
bjn\4188
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Kurzet argues that the trial court erred in awarding
Bailey-Allen post-judgment interest beginning two and one-half
months after the trial court verbally rendered its decision, but
prior to actually signing the judgment.

However, the trial court

based its decision on the fact that Kurzet, under order of the
court to do so, did not prepare the findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and judgments in a timely fashion.

In the interests of

justice, and based on the circumstances of the case, the trial
court awarded post-judgment interest to Bailey-Allen from the time
the trial court verbally "rendered" the judgment.
The trial court properly rendered its judgment in the
case, and Bailey-Allen respectfully requests this Court to uphold
the trial court's decision.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE FACTS, THE
PARTIES' INTENT, AND THE LAW.
A.

Background to the Trial Court's Decision.
Kurzet raises, as its principal issue on appeal, that the

trial court erred in granting a judgment in favor of Bailey-Allen
(allegedly on an unjust enrichment theory) when there was a written
contract governing the transaction between the parties. Kurzet
expresses concern that the trial court has somehow inappropriately
bjn\4188
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mixed "contract" and "unjust enrichment" remedies. Kurzet further
claims that the trial court was confused, if not inconsistent, when
applying the facts to the law.

Kurzet

asserts that

it is

impossible to find that Bailey-Allen breached the construction
contract and likewise be entitled to a judgment against Kurzet.
The trial court was not confused, nor did it misapply the
law.

To understand the ruling, it is essential to understand how

the trial court made its decision.
After three days of trial, the trial court ruled that
Kurzet owed Bailey-Allen the net sum of $11,141 for services
rendered in connection with the construction of Kurzet7s Park City
residence.

(R. at 805.)
$10,000

+

5,500

Such amount was calculated as follows:

(amounts
earned
under
the
construction
contract)
(amounts which Bailey-Allen saved Kurzet in
payment for lumber ordered by a prior
contractor)

$15,500
4,359

(total amount owed by Kurzet)
(offsets awarded by the trial court for
faulty construction)

$11,141

The amount owed to Bailey-Allen from Kurzet,
plus prejudgment interest at 10% per annum
from 11-1-90 to 4-17-92 and post-judgment
interest at 12% per annum from and after 4-1792.

(R. at 218-19.)

bjn\4188
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The award for $10,000 was clearly awarded pursuant to the
construction contract.

The trial court did not make such award

under an "unjust enrichment" theory.

(R. at 218.)

The award for $5,500 for the savings on the cost of
lumber was rendered under an "unjust enrichment" theory. The trial
court found that Bailey-Allen's work and negotiations with regard
to the lumber constituted a benefit to Kurzet.
749.)

(R. at 216 and 748-

Such savings and the resulting benefit to Kurzet were not

covered in the contract between Kurzet and Bailey-Allen.
13.)

(R. at 9-

The contract, which was drafted by Kurzet, stated that the

"Contractor will obtain competitive bids for services and materials
. . . ."

(R. at 10.)

The lumber was already at the building site

from a previous contractor, but Kurzet had not yet paid for it.
(R. at 748-49.) Bailey-Allen took the time to count every piece of
lumber and calculate its value, then recommended that Kurzet pay
only $22,500 for the lumber, rather than the previously-billed
price of $28,000. (Id.) Kurzet took Bailey-Allen's recommendation
and was able to save the sum of $5,500.

Counting and calculating

lumber already delivered was not part of obtaining "competitive
bids" as stated in the contract.
It does not matter whether the award of $5,500 was made
pursuant to the contract, or whether the trial court found that
such services were outside the contract and awarded under a theory
bjn\4188
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of "unjust enrichment."

Either theory would be supported by the

facts presented at trial. Certainly, Kurzet enjoyed the benefit of
a $5,500 savings which resulted from actions of Bailey-Allen.
Consequently, the trial court was not confusing theories
of contract and unjust enrichment in its award to Bailey-Allen. It
awarded $10,000 to Bailey-Allen under the contract on the basis of
the fair amount of services that Bailey-Allen rendered to Kurzet,
and $5,500 under the theory of unjust enrichment for benefit which
Kurzet received by the savings in lumber costs.
B.

Kurzet's Construction Contract Did Not Prohibit Payment
to Bailey-Allen for Services Rendered Prior to
Termination of the Contract.
The trial court was not confused as to remedies, as is

suggested by Kurzet.

The confusion, if any, arose in the trial

court having to interpret the parties' intent from an ambiguous and
incomplete contract drafted by Kurzet.

(R. at 217.) The contract

contained no provision outlining remedies in case of default by
either party.

(R. at 009, the Agreement.) As a result, following

the evidence presented at trial, the trial court was faced with the
task of deciding what the parties had really intended in such a
situation.

(R. at 217.)

As a result, this is a case of contract

interpretation (a question of fact), not a matter of confusion as
to remedies.

bjn\4188
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When

"the document appears to incompletely express the

parties' agreement or if it is ambiguous

in expressing that

agreement," the court may resort to the use of extrinsic evidence.
Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt v. Blomquist. 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah
1989).

see also Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1062

(Utah 1981) ("when an ambiguity exists which cannot be reconciled
by an objective and reasonable interpretation of the contract as a
whole that resort may be had to the use of extrinsic evidence.")
Kurzet confuses the factual findings of the trial court
with alleged inappropriate legal conclusions.
ambiguous

and

incomplete

contract

to

the

To interpret an
parties'

presumed

intentions under all of the evidence submitted to the trial court
in three days of trial is clearly a factual interpretation, not a
legal conclusion of law.

"The findings and conclusions of the

District Court must be affirmed unless there is no reasonable basis
in the evidence to support them."
P.2d 512, 514 (Utah 1980).

Nielsen v. Chin-Hsien Wang, 613

In the instant case, the result of the

trial court was a decision reached after listening to days of trial
about the amount of time worked, the hours spent, the services
rendered, the results obtained, and the percentage of completion of
the construction project.

To second guess the trial court at this

point would be to overrule its factual determinations to the
windfall of Kurzet.
bjn\4188
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Kurzet argues that the trial court's ruling that BaileyAllen breached the construction contract somehow prevented BaileyAllen from being paid for pre-breach services, even though Kurzet
offered no evidence of general damages arising from the breach.
Had Kurzet wanted a contract which would have required Bailey-Allen
to forfeit previously-earned contractor fees in case of a default
during construction, he could have incorporated such a provision
into the construction contract.

He did not do so.

The contract

drafted by Kurzet was silent as to remedies and damages in case of
default by either party.

(R. at 302, pp. 19-20.)

The trial court

merely found that following a mid-construction breach by BaileyAllen, Kurzet was required to pay previously-earned fees pursuant
to the contract.

(R. at 803-804.)

The difficulty in assessing damages was not the trial
court's misunderstanding of the law, as suggested by Kurzet, but
arose in the interpretation of Kurzet's home-spun construction
contract which contained no provisions to guide the parties in case
of default.

It was the contract's ambiguity and incompleteness

that troubled the trial court, not a confusion of the law.
The trial court found that Kurzet had been the general
contractor on the job for a period of three months, during which
time the construction had achieved ten percent
expected total work under the contract.
bjn\4188
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(10%) of the

(R. at 216.) When Bailey-

Allen was terminated, the home had reached a stage of being framed
and partially roofed-in.
It

is a

(R. at 677.)

"well-established

rule" in Utah

"that any

uncertainty with respect to construction of a contract should be
resolved against the party who had drawn the agreement."

Sears v.

Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Utah 1982). Further, when there is
an ambiguity in a contract that could have been readily defined,
the ambiguous language should be construed against the party who
drafted the provision. Metro. Prop. & Liability v. Finlayson, 751
P.2d 254, 257 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

Having no contractual default

provision to guide its decision, the trial court in the instant
case considered several alternatives to determine what, if any,
compensation Bailey-Allen was entitled to receive for the services
it rendered in the partial construction of Kurzet's residence.
Even a valid termination of the construction contract by Kurzet,
absent claimed damages, cannot override the fact that compensation
had already been earned under the contract.
The trial court found, in interpreting the contract and
the parties' presumed intent, that the contract allowed BaileyAllen some pre-termination compensation for its services rendered
as general contractor.

(R. at 218.)

Although Kurzet argues that

the trial court misapplied an "unjust enrichment" remedy in a
contract case, the trial court did not do so.

bjn\4188
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It merely selected

a measure of damages missing from the contract after the trial
court heard all of the evidence of the parties.
Since the construction contract drafted by Kurzet did not
contain a provision wherein Bailey-Allen would forfeit all of the
previously-earned

contractor

fee

if terminated

prior

to the

finishing of the Kurzet resident, the trial court was required to
interpret Kurzet7s incomplete contract based upon the facts of the
case and to follow the parties presumed

intention under the

ambiguous terms of the contract.
Even if the award had been made on an unjust enrichment
theory, the special circumstances of this case allow such a remedy
where the written contract failed to provide a remedy in case of
default.

M

A plaintiff is entitled to recover based on the unjust

enrichment of a defendant when the plaintiff has no alternative
right on an enforceable contract.11

Backus v. Apishapa Land and

Cattle Co. , 615 P.2d 42, 44 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980).

In the instant

case, because of the incompleteness and ambiguity of the contract,
Bailey-Allen had no right under the contract to damages and the
trial

court

was

justified

construction completed.

in

awarding

a percentage

of the

To recover under unjust enrichment, a

plaintiff must have conferred a benefit on the defendant "which the
defendant accepted or retained, making it inequitable for him to
retain the benefit without payment."
bjn\4188
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Id. ; see also Davies v.

Olson. 746 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("If defendant . . .
requested services and received a benefit which would be unjustly
retained, he is liable under quantum meruit [unjust enrichment].")
Even though Kurzet denies that he received any benefit
from Bailey-Allen and claims that Bailey-Allen did not perform
satisfactorily as a general contractor (R. at 513-16), excerpts
from

Kurzet's

construction

log

book

illustrate

that

he was

generally pleased with the progress of construction throughout the
three-month period that Bailey-Allen supervised the work on the
Kurzet home.
were:

Some of the comments Kurzet wrote in his log book

"good progress on framing" on August 2, 1990 (R. at 608);

"things continue to go well" on August 3, 1990 (R. at 609); and,
"had a warm feeling that things are going okay" on September 26,
1990 (just a few days before Kurzet terminated Bailey-Allen) (R. at
611) .

In

addition,

Kurzet

agreed

with

Bailey-Allen's

recommendation to pay $5,500 less on the lumber (R. at 123-24), and
he acknowledged in his testimony at trial that Bailey-Allen did
provide him with good subcontractors and other services (R. at 65961) .
Bailey-Allen worked

for three months on the Kurzet

residence, but was not paid anything for its general contractor
services.

(R. at 50-51 and 595.)

Because of the contract with

Kurzet, Bailey-Allen passed up bidding on other jobs for the winter
bjn\4188

16

of 1990-91.

(R. at 337.)

After being terminated by Kurzet,

Bailey-Allen was unable to obtain any substantial work throughout
the winter of 1990-91 because of the state of the economy and only
brought in $13,000 during that time.

(R. at 359-364.) Under these

circumstances, it would be unjust for Kurzet to refuse to pay
Bailey-Allen for the benefits he received from its services as
general contractor for three months.
concluded

that

Kurzet

termination services.

was

benefited

The trial court correctly
by

Bailey-Allen's

pre-

(R. at 216.)

The trial court's award to Bailey-Allen was based on an
interpretation of the construction contract, not an application of
an unjust enrichment remedy. However, the award could be supported
under

an

unjust

enrichment

theory

because

of

the

special

circumstances of this case, where the written agreement contained
no provisions relating to the measure of damages.
C.

The Trial Court was Correct in its Method of Measuring
Bailey-Allen's Award of Damages Under the Contract.
In determining the amount owed to Bailey-Allen at the

time of the termination of the contract, the trial court considered
several alternatives to fill in the void created by the incomplete
contract. The trial court was urged to consider that the length of
construction was one-fourth done and to give Bailey-Allen one-

fa jn\4188
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fourth of the $100,000 fee, but the court did not accept such
argument.

(R. at 802-803.)
The trial court also considered other alternatives, such

as the percentage of money spent on the construction project or the
number of hours worked by Bailey-Allen.

(R. at 802.) However, the

trial court decided against such alternatives.

(Id.)

The alternative adopted by the trial court was to award
Bailey-Allen compensation in relation to the percentage of the
amount of work completed on the contract during the time BaileyAllen was on the job.

(R. at 216.)

Because Kurzet submitted no claim for damages (other than
the minor offsets granted by the trial court), the trial court was
correct in not assessing additional damages against Bailey-Allen
and in awarding compensation earned prior to termination of the
contract.

Such a method of calculating earned compensation does

not inappropriately mix remedies of contract and unjust enrichment.
As to the award of the savings of the lumber under the
theory of unjust enrichment, the trial court gave Bailey-Allen the
value of the benefit to Kurzet.
Utah

Court

of

Appeals

in

This follows the ruling by the

Davies

that

damages

under

unjust

enrichment (also referred to as quasi-contract) are to measured by
"the

value

of

the

benefit

conferred

on

the

defendant

(the

defendant's gain) and not the detriment incurred by the plaintiff,
bjn\4188
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or necessarily the reasonable value of plaintiff's services.11
Davies v. Olson. 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Therefore, the trial court was correct in measuring
Bailey-Allen's damage award under the contract as the value of
Bailey-Allen's services as general contractor in percentage to the
work completed on Kurzet's residence. Furthermore, the trial court
correctly awarded the amount of the lumber savings by using the
value of the benefit conferred upon Kurzet.
D.

A Breach of Contract by Bailey-Allen Does Not Require
That Previously-Earned Compensation Be Forfeited.
Kurzet further argues that it is inconsistent for the

trial court to find that Bailey-Allen breached the construction
contract and also grant a judgment in favor of Bailey-Allen.
logic does not make sense.

Such

A mid-construction breach by Bailey-

Allen does not require it to forfeit previously-earned compensation
for its services under the contract.
Consider the following hypothetical situation. A general
contractor has completed 99% of the construction of a home over a
one-year

construction

period.

Just

prior

to

completion

of

construction, the contractor's liability insurance lapses and the
homeowner terminates the general contractor because of such fact.
The final one percent of construction is completed by another
contractor for one percent of the total contractor's fee.
bjn\4188
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The

homeowner then argues that the first contractor is entitled to no
compensation for the entire year's work, even though the owner
suffered no monetary damages. Such a result would be tremendously
unfair.

In the absence of other damages to the owner, or a

specific contract term to the contrary, the logical result would be
to give the contractor the benefit of the contract price, less the
uncompleted work.
Similarly, in the instant case, the trial court applied
the same rationale to a situation where the work was ten percent
(10%) completed.

The trial court, in the absence of missing

contractual direction (R. at 217), awarded the contractor the value
of its services under the applied percentage of completion (R. at
218) .

To apply such a measure of contract damages is not an

inappropriate application of unjust enrichment theory to the case.
It should be noted that Bailey-Allen argued at trial that
the home was 25% completed at the time of termination.
747.)

(R. at

It was Kurzet's witness who came up with the 10% figure

accepted by the trial court.

(R. at 215.) As a result, the trial

court granted judgment in the lowest amount possible under the
evidence submitted.

bjn\4188
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E.

As General Contractor. Bailey-Allen was Liable for
Actions of the Subcontractors and Should Likewise Be
Responsible for the Progress of the Subcontractors.
At the trial, Kurzet argued that, as general contractor,

Bailey-Allen should be liable for any faulty construction or delays
caused by subcontractors or suppliers.

(R. at 647-59,)

The trial

court ruled, in essence, that it would be inconsistent to make
Bailey-Allen

responsible

for

any

delays

or

mistakes

of

subcontractors without also giving Bailey-Allen the reciprocal
benefit (as general contractor) of good work done by subcontractors
and suppliers.

Indeed, Kurzet cannot have it both ways.

Bailey-Allen is not seeking, nor receiving a windfall.
It merely seeks the benefit of its contractual rights —
more and nothing less.

nothing

The evidence was plentiful that Bailey-

Allen performed substantial contractor services.

While Bailey-

Allen was the general contractor, the Kurzet residence went from
basically a foundation to three framed floors of over 14,000 square
feet, with a partially-finished roof.

(R. at 677.)

Bailey-Allen

ordered supplies (R. 659-60), obtained bids, and worked with the
city to arrange numerous inspections, along with other services as
general contractor.

(R. at 752-53.)

Also, Bailey-Allen provided

Kurzet with good subcontractors (R. at 659-61), and supervised the
work of the subcontractors (R. at 660).

Moreover, Kurzet was

generally pleased with Bailey-Allen's progress throughout the three
bjn\4188
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months Bailey-Allen worked as the general contractor, as evidenced
by Kurzet's written comments throughout his log book.

An entry

written by Kurzet only a few days before Bailey-Allen's termination
on October 2, 1990, stated that Kurzet "had a warm feeling that
things are going okay" (September 26, 1990).

(R. at 611).

Kurzet wants to enjoy the contractual benefits conveyed
by Bailey-Allen without paying for those benefits.

Indeed, an

award of $11,141 for three months' work as general contractor on a
million dollar home hardly seems an abuse of discretion for the
services rendered by Bailey-Allen.
F.

The Time Spent on the Job Site bv Bailey-Allen is
Irrelevant in a Fixed-Fee Contract.
Kurzet argues that Bailey-Allen spent only 60.5 hours of

time on site during the three-month period.
p. 21.)

Such an assertion is clearly wrong.

(Brief of Appellant,
It should be noted

that the contract called for two types of work and compensation.
First, general contracting services were to be performed for a fee
of $100,000.

(R. at 214-15.) Second, any actual work performed by

the general contractor (i.e. pouring concrete, framing, etc.) was
to be billed on an hourly basis.

(R. at 215.)

The 60.5 hours

referred to by Kurzet are the amount of hours of actual labor
performed by Bailey-Allen (and paid for by Kurzet), not the hours
for the general contractor services.
bjn\4188
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(R. at 357.)

Bailey-Allen did not need to keep tract of every hour
spent on general contracting services because the amount of time
spent was immaterial to the agreed compensation.

Indeed, the

construction contract did not require a certain number of hours on
the project by the general contractor, nor its on-site presence at
any particular hour of the day.

(R. at 009, the Agreement.)

As

long as the work was progressing under Bailey-Allen's direction,
Bailey-Allen was fulfilling the terms of the contract.
The result reached by the trial court is consistent with
the facts and the law.

To rule otherwise would give Kurzet a

windfall not intended by the parties. Had Kurzet intended a breach
of the contract by Bailey-Allen to create a forfeiture of moneys
previously earned, he could have written that harsh remedy into the
contract.

He did not do so and the courts should not impose such

a strict result upon the Bailey-Allen.
II.

THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO BE AWARDED KURZET IN
CONNECTION WITH THE DISMISSED CAUSES OF ACTION IS
DISCRETIONARY AND SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED BY THIS COURT.
Kurzet next argues that the trial court erred in failing

to award, in its discretion, attorney's fees in connection with
dismissal of Bailey-Allen's mechanic's lien claim and the claim
based upon Kurzet's failure to post a contractor's bond.
Pursuant to pretrial motions, on August 26, 1991, the
trial court dismissed three of Bailey-Allen's causes of action:
bjn\4188
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(i) a mechanic's lien claim; (ii) a claim of liability based upon
Kurzet's failure to post a contractors bond; and (iii) the claim
for relief under a theory of unjust enrichment.

(R. at 299.) The

trial court reserved its ruling on Kurzet's request for attorney's
fees.

(R. at 128.)

(The unjust enrichment claim was later

reinstated by the trial court, sua sponte, prior to trial.

(R. at

158.))
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that •• [i]t is this
Court's policy to accord great deference to the discretionary
conclusions of the trial court regarding attorney fees."

Paul

Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n. . 657 P.2d 1279, 1287 (Utah
1982) . "Attorney's fees cannot be allowed unless there is evidence
to support them."

Id.

After listening to all of the evidence

presented at trial, the trial court exercised its discretionary
powers and did not award attorney's fees to Kurzet.
Statutes relating to the mechanic's lien claim and the
contractor's bond claim give the trial court discretion in awarding
of fees to the successful party.

There is no statutory authority

for the awarding of attorney's fees in dismissal of an unjust
enrichment claim.
The applicable statute relating to the awarding of
attorneys' fees in a mechanic's lien case is Utah Code Ann. § 38-118 (1993), which states in pertinent part:
bjn\4188

24

In any action brought to enforce any lien
under this chapter the successful party shall
be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys'
fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be
taxed as costs in the action.
The applicable statute relating to the awarding of fees
in a contractor bond case is Utah Code Ann, § 14-2-2(3) (1993) ,
which is as follows:
(3) In an action for failure to obtain a
bond,
the
court
may
award
reasonable
attorneys' fees to the prevailing party.
These fees shall be taxed as costs in the
action. (emphasis added)
This statute specifically allows a trial court to use its
discretion based upon the facts of a case.
Kurzet requested the sum of $2,137.50 in attorney's fees
in connection with its motion to dismiss.
application

for

attorney's

fees, Kurzet

(R. at 111-12.)
made

no

In its

attempt

to

distinguish its services rendered on the unjust enrichment claim
from the other two causes of action.

There was no way the trial

court could arbitrarily distinguish such services. The trial court
deferred the decision on fees until later.

(R. at 128.)

In Paul Mueller Company, the Utah Supreme Court used the
case of Utah Farm Production Credit Association v. Cox as an
example where the court properly refused to award attorney's fees
because the "prevailing plaintiff failed to provide enough proof to
enable the court to distinguish the portion of plaintiff's fees
bjn\4188
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spent in prosecuting the complaint from the portion spent in
defending the counterclaim."

657 P.2d 1279, 1288 (Utah 1982).

Likewise, Kurzet never attempted to segregate his fees on
the various causes of action, but renewed his motion for fees at
the conclusion of trial.

(R. at 194.) After having heard all the

evidence, the trial court in its allowed discretion, failed to
grant attorney's fees to Kurzet in connection with the prior
motions to dismiss.

(R. at 300, p. 22.)

It should also be noted that the trial court did not
award

Bailey-Allen

attorney's

fees

on

its Motion

to

Compel

Findings, Conclusion and Judgment, which motion was granted by the
trial court on April 17, 1992.
The trial court has discretion in awarding attorneys'
fees and did not err in refusing to award Kurzet (or Bailey-Allen)
attorney's fees.
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED BAILEY-ALLEN PREJUDGMENT
INTEREST.
Kurzet

argues

that

even

if he

owes money

on the

construction contract, he should not have to pay prejudgment
interest thereon at the statutory rate. Such argument asserts that
the debt was non-liquidated until the time of trial and under Utah
case law, is exempt from prejudgment interest.

bjn\4188
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Kurzet further

argues that prejudgment

interest is inapplicable to cases of

"unjust enrichment."
Kurzet's brief cites Shoreline Development, Inc. v. Utah
County as support for his contention that Bailey-Allen is not
entitled to a prejudgment interest award.

Even if applicable,

Shoreline does not prevent an award of interest in the instant
case.

First, Shoreline involved a case in equity which is not

applicable to the instant case of contract. Shoreline Development,
Inc. v. Utah County, 835 P.2d 207 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

Second,

Shoreline involved a jury decision awarding the amount of damages,
rather than a judge, and the Utah Court of Appeals felt that "there
is a risk of double recovery if prejudgment interest [is] added to
a jury's equity award by the trial court which does not know
whether the jury's award covers interest."

Id. at 211.

Third,

Shoreline specifically provides for an award of interest in unjust
enrichment cases tried directly to the court.

It only prohibits

prejudgment interest in unjust enrichment cases tried to a jury.
Id. at 212.
In the instant case, there was no jury involved in
deciding Bailey-Allen's award of damages. The trial judge decided
that prejudgment interest was appropriate under the circumstances
and there was no danger of "double recovery" due to a prior jury
award.
bjn\4188
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The

Supreme Court

of Utah has given the following

guidelines for awarding prejudgment interest:
[W]here the damage is complete and the amount
of the loss is fixed as of a particular timef
and that loss can be measured by facts and
figures, interest should be allowed from that
time and not from the date of judgment. On
the other hand, where damages are incomplete
or cannot be calculated with mathematical
accuracy, such as in case of personal injury,
wrongful death, defamation of character, false
imprisonment, etc., the amount of the damage
must be ascertained and assessed by the trier
of the fact at the trial, and in such cases
prejudgment interest is not allowed.
Biork v. April Industries. Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977).
While it is certainly true that neither party knew the
amount Kurzet would be required to pay until the time of trial,
such situation exists in any trial.

In the instant case, the

percentage of completion of the construction was easily determined
by Kurzet had he wanted to do so.

Indeed, it was Kurzet's own

witness who gave the trial court the ten percent (10%) completion
figure.
Finally, this is not a case of equity (i.e., personal
injury,

defamation,

etc.)

where

prejudgment

interest

is

inappropriate.
A debt was owed by Kurzet to Bailey-Allen.

In order to

receive the benefit of its contractual rights to payment, BaileyAllen deserves an award of prejudgment interest. To rule otherwise
bjn\4188
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would only reward Kurzet from failing to pay its bills at the
expense of Bailey-Allen.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED BAILEY-ALLEN POST-JUDGMENT
INTEREST FROM AND AFTER A PERIOD COMMENCING FOUR MONTHS AFTER
THE TRIAL COURTS VERBAL DECISION.
The trial court rendered its decision from the bench at

the conclusion of the last day of trial (January 30, 1992) .
such

time,

the

trial

appropriate pleadings.
Rule

court

ordered

Kurzet

to

prepare

At
the

(R. at 806.)

4-504 of

the

Code

of Judicial

Administration

requires such pleadings to be submitted within fifteen (15) days of
the date of the order.

Rule 4-504 states in pertinent part:

(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for
the party or parties obtaining the ruling
shall within fifteen days, or within a shorter
time as the court may direct, file with the
court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in
conformity with the ruling.
After the time allowed by the rule had passed, and after
the passage of several more weeks, counsel for Bailey-Allen filed
a Motion to Compel Filing of Findings, Conclusions and Judgment,
asking the trial court to compel Kurzet to prepare the required
pleadings. The motion was granted. When Kurzet finally filed its
proposed pleadings, Bailey-Allen filed objections thereto.
matter was set for hearing on April 17, 1993.

The

Because Kurzet's

failure in submitting timely pleadings caused a delay in the actual
bjn\4188
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signing of the judgment, the trial court ordered that statutory
interest

(12%) should commence at such time, rather than the

previously accruing statutory interest at the legal rate (10%).
(R. at

300, Reporter's Transcript

of Hearing

on Defendant's

Proposed Findings and Judgment, at pp.4 and 22).
The applicable statute relating to interest on judgements
is Rule 54(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which states in
pertinent part:
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the
judgment.
The clerk must include in any
judgment signed by him any interest on the
verdict or decision from the time it was
rendered, and the costs, if the same have been
taxed or ascertained. (Emphasis added)
The judgment in this case was verbally "rendered" by the
trial court on January 30, 1991.

Applying the time period and

effect of both Rule 4-504(1) of the Code of Judicial Administration
and Rule 54(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, post-judgment
interest would generally commence approximately fifteen (15) days
after a verbal ruling when the required pleadings were to have been
submitted to the trial court for signature.

The intent of these

rules is to allow a judgment creditor to be compensated for his
unpaid debt at the rate applicable to judgments.
In the instant case, the formal judgment was not signed
until October 6, 1991 —
after the trial.
bjn\4188
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(R. at 222.) Inasmuch as the delay through April
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17, 1991 was entirely caused by Kurzet's failure to file the
required pleadings, it is appropriate that he should not benefit
from a lower interest rate until the actual judgment was signed by
the trial judge.

Under the circumstances of this case, to hold

that the January 30, 1992, verbal judgment was not "rendered" until
"entered" October 10, 1992 would only reward Kurzet for the delays
for which he was directly responsible.
Parenthetically, this issue raised by Kurzet involves
approximately $100 in interest (the difference in 10% interest and
12% interest on the judgment for less than six months).

In light

of the fact that Kurzet has owed Bailey-Allen the judgment amount
since

October,

1990, such

amount

is

not

unfair

under

the

circumstances and follows the implied intent of above-quoted Rules.
On the basis of fairness and the circumstances of the
case, the trial court's ruling that Bailey-Allen is entitled to
post-judgment interest of twelve percent (12%) running from April
17, 1992, should be upheld.

The judgment was "rendered" by such

date.

CONCLUSION
The trial court was not in error or confused about the
remedies in this case. In interpreting an ambiguous and incomplete
contract
bjn\4188
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Kurzet, the trial
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court merely

awarded

compensation earned by Bailey-Allen prior to the time the contract
was terminated.

The trial court also correctly awarded to Bailey-

Allen the value of the benefit conferred upon Kurzet by the savings
in lumber.
The trial court did not error in the exercise of its
discretion in failing to award Kurzet attorney's fees in connection
with motions to dismiss Bailey-Allen's claims.
Furthermore, the interest awarded by the trial court on
the judgment against Kurzet was properly assessed, both before and
after judgment.
Appellee Bailey-Allen respectfully requests this Court to
uphold the trial court's judgment.
DATED this ,3o

day of July, 1993.
ALLOTRELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN

Bridge J. Nelson
Attorneys for Appellee Bailey-Allen
Company, Inc.
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bjn\4188

33

Esq.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BAILEY-ALLEN COMPANY, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.

Case No. 930178-CA

STANLEY M. KURZET, an
individual; STANLEY M. KURZET
and ANNE L. KURZET, as Trustees
for The Kurzet Family Trust;
THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST; and
JOHN DOES I through X,

Priority 15

Defendants-Appellants.

ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF APPELLEE BAILEY-ALLEN COMPANY, INC.

Appeal from the Judgment of the
Third Judicial District Court
for Summit County, State of Utah
Honorable Homer Wilkinson, District Judge
Bruce J. Nelson, Esq. (2380)
ALLEN NELSON RASMUSSEN
& CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellee
215 S. State Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-8400
Spencer E. Austin, Esq. (0150)
William J. Evans, Esq. (5276)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendants
and Appellants
201 S. Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234

ADDENDUM

A.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

B.

JUDGMENT

C.

AGREEMENT

D.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
1.
2.
3.
4.

Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2(3) (1993)
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (1993)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(e) (1993)
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-504(1)
(1993)

ADDENDUM A

I<'iLED
SPENCER E. AUSTIN (0150)
WILLIAM J. EVANS (5276)
of and for
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendants
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234

OCT

:• i - ; 2

Clerk of Summit County

*x
D*pvtyCJ«rt

jf-

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

BAILEY-ALLEN COMPANY, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)

STANLEY M. KURZET, an
individual; STANLEY M. KURZET
and ANNE L. KURZET, as Trustees
for THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST;
THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST; and
John Does 1 through 10,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil No. 10870

)

* * * * * * * *

This action, having been tried to the Court, and the
Court, having considered the evidence and the arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, hereby makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court finds that the parties intended to and

did enter into a written contract wherein plaintiff agreed to act

000214

as the general contractor and to oversee the construction of
defendants1 residence in Park City, Utah.
2.
ties provided

The Court finds that the contract between the parthat plaintiff

would

complete

construction on

defendants' residence within one year and, in return, defendant
would pay plaintiff $100,000 consideration for plaintifffs services in directing and supervising the construction, and $22.00
per hour for plaintifffs own hands-on labor.
3.

The Court finds that plaintiff was aware that

defendants had experienced problems with prior general contractors and had terminated two general contractors for unsatisfactory performance.

Plaintiff was also aware that Mr. Kurzet was a

meticulous and demanding individual and would require exacting
performance of the contract.
4.

The Court finds the parties intended and the con-

tract provided for plaintiff, within 10 days after entering into
the contract, to provide defendants with evidence of adequate
liability insurance covering its work pursuant to the contract.
5.

The

Court

finds that plaintiff

represented

to

defendants that plaintiff had $1 million in liability insurance
coverage in force at the time the parties entered into the contract on July 3, 1990, that defendants wanted $4-5 million in
coverage, and that plaintiff later discovered its policy was only

-2-
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for $300,000 coverage and that it had been cancelled on October
24, 1989.

6.

The Court finds that, in a memorandum of July 20,

1990 from defendants to plaintiff, which was delivered to Michael
Kent, defendants notified plaintiff that plaintiff had not yet
provided the necessary certificate evidencing insurance coverage
and that defendants required such evidence under the terms of the
contract.
7.

The court find that defendants terminated plain-

tiff's services on October 2, 1990.
8.

The Court finds, that about 10% of the construc-

tion project was completed while plaintiff was general contractor
and, based on that percentage, defendants received a benefit from
plaintiff's pre-termination services in the amount of $10,000
regardless of whether plaintiff performed its duties under the
contract.
9.

The Court finds that defendants realized a benefit

of $5,500 which represents the amount saved by defendants through
plaintiff's services involving negotiations for the purchase of
lumber.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court concludes that the subject contract was

ambiguous and incomplete as drafted and that the Court has a
responsibility to add to it and to look upon it as an oral contract between the parties*
2.

The

Court

concludes

that the contract

can be

interpreted as written.
3.

The Court concludes that given the amount of the

subject contract and the cost of the construction, plaintiff had
a duty to inquire into the adequacy of its insurance coverage for
the project, but did not.
4.

The Court concludes that plaintiff's failure to

promptly provide evidence of adequate liability insurance was a
material breach of the contract.
5.

The Court concludes that defendants were justified

in terminating plaintiff's services for plaintiff's breach of its
obligation to promptly provide evidence of adequate liability
insurance.
6.

The Court concludes that defendants were justified

in terminating plaintiff's services because plaintiff spent very
few hours on the job site and did not give the construction
project the attention that it required under the contract and
that plaintiff knew Mr. Kurzet would expect.
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7.

The Court concludes that defendants are not in

breach of the contract in any way,
8.

With

respect

to

plaintiff's

Unjust

Enrichment

Claim, the Court has considered several alternative methods of
calculating any award to plaintiff under such a theory.

The

Court concludes the most logical basis to be the percentage of
defendants' residence that was completed during the period plaintiff was on the job.
9.

The Court rejects plaintiff's proposal that it

should receive 1/4 or $25,000, of the $100,000 consideration contemplated under the contract because it spent three months on the
job, or one quarter, of the one-year period for constructing the
residence as contemplated under the contract.

The Court finds

that such a proposal is unreasonable and unsupported by the
facts.
10.

The Court concludes that plaintiff is entitled to

receive $15,500 from defendant in quantum meruit/unjust enrichment, based on the contract between plaintiff and defendants,
$10,000 representing 1/10 of the contract price of $100,000 for
services in completing 1/10 of the construction, and $5,500 for
services involving negotiations for the purchase of lumber.
11.

The Court concludes that plaintiff is liable to

defendant for the sum of $1,800 which represents defendants'
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costs in repairing plaintiff's faulty construction of defendants'
east side retaining wall.
12*

The Court concludes that plaintiff is liable to

defendants in the amount of $2,000 which represents defendants'
costs in repairing plaintiff's faulty construction of defendants'
west side concrete steps.
13.

The Court concludes that plaintiff is liable to

defendants in the amount of $559, which represents defendants'
costs for plaintiff's ordering three unnecessary Glu-Lam beams.
14.

The

Court

concludes

plaintiff

is

entitled

to

pre-judgment interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum,
from November 1, 1990, the date defendants terminated plaintiff's
services, to April 17, 1992, the date this Court granted plaintiffs'

Motion

to

Compel

Filing

of

Findings

of

Fact,

and

post-judgment interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per
annum from and after April 17, 1992.
DATED this

^

day of

C&%

» , 1992,

BY THE COURT:

^?^z^^%t<

HOMER WILKINSON
District Court Judge
OVED AS TO FORM:

li

:C:

\Ss^

IUCE J. NELSON
Attorney for Plaintiff

*»*l.
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SPENCER E. AUSTIN (0150)
WILLIAM J. EVANS (5276)
of and for
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendants
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234

Clerk o* Summit County
BY

A&
Deputy & A

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

BAILEY-ALLEN COMPANY, INC.,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs,
STANLEY M. KURZET, an
individual; STANLEY M. KURZET
and ANNE L. KURZET, as Trustees
for THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST;
THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST; and
John Does 1 through 10,

Civil No. 10870

Defendants.
* * * * * * * *

This action came on for trial before the Court, the
Honorable Homer Wilkinson, District Judge, presiding, and the
issues, having been duly tried to the Court, and the Court having
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That plaintiff recover from defendants in quantum

meruit/unjust enrichment, based on the contract between plaintiff
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and defendants, the amount of $11,141.00, with interest thereon
at the legal rate provided by law in accordance with paragraph 4
below, which represents $10,000 for services rendered in directing and supervising l/10th of the construction of defendants1
residence, and $5,500 for plaintiff's services involving negotiations for the purchase of lumber, adjusted by applying as an offset the following awards to defendants:
a.

The sum of $1,800 which represents defen-

dants' costs in repairing plaintiff's faulty construction of
defendants' east side retaining wall;
b.

The sum of $2,000 which represents defen-

dants' costs in repairing plaintiff's faulty construction of
defendants' west side concrete steps; and
c.

The sum of $559 which represents defendants'

costs caused by plaintiff's ordering three unnecessary materials;
2.

That defendants are not entitled to attorneys'

fees and costs attributable to defendants' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment;
3.

That plaintiff is awarded $542.40 as its costs of

court itemized as follows :
a.

Filing fee, $75,00;

b.

Service of process fees, $32.25;

c.

Kurzet deposition; $311.15;
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4.

d.

Bailey/Kent depositions, $99*00; and

e.

Expert witness fee, $25.00.

That plaintiff is entitled t o pre-judgment inter-

est o n $11,141.00 at the rate of t e n percent
the

period

post-judgment

from

November

(10%) p e r annum for

1, 1 9 9 0 to April

1 7 , 1992,

interest at the rate of twelve percent

and

(12%) p e r

a n n u m from and after April 17, 1992; a n d
5.

That

defendant's

counterclaims

a r e hereby

dis-

m i s s e d with prejudice.
day of

DATED t h i s

. 1992.

BY T H E COURT:

/—f^h^^

~^*ttgj^,,

HOMER WILKINSON
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM

V* ', CC'UftTY
iRUCE J .

"'"/iiis:-.--- -.

NELSON

Attorney for Plaintiff
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A G R E E M E N T
This Agreement covers all of the understandings existing
between BAILEY-ALLEN (Contractor) and STANLEY KURZET (Owner) for
the construction of a residence on LOT #4 of the EVERGREEN
development at DEER VALLEY, PARK CITY, UTAH*
The Contractor is retained by Owner on a cost plus fixed fee
basis. Costs shall be billed monthly and payment shall be made
within ten days of receipt of billing. The fee fixed for this
contract is set at $100,000 for the residence as depicted in the
drawings plus a maximum of $50,000 in directed additional work, if
any. Any directed additional work in excess of an aggregate cost
of $50,000 will result in additional fees based on 7% of the cost
of such additional work.
All billing incorporating costs involving subcontractors or
suppliers will be supported by copies of invoices clearly showing
that the services were performed and/or materials delivered at the
job site and shall further carry the notation by Contractor that
the billing is true and correct.
In the event that Owner's absence from Park City would result
in failing to pay Contractor in a timely manner as set forth above.
Contractor may Fax the billing to Owner and Owner shall cause
payment to by made by express mail or electronic transfer directly
to Contractor's account, however, when such payment is made, Owner
reserves the right to review and obtain adjustment if indicated
pending the opportunity to review the records and work performed
upon Owner's return.
Both Contractor and Owner stipulate that this contract cannot
be changed except and unless in writing, bearing the date and
signatures of both parties.
The residence shall be constructed in accordance with the
drawings and no change will be made without the express written
consent of Owner. All changes will be covered by a written Change
Order in the form of EXHIBIT A attached hereto, describing the
nature of the change, the resulting differential in costs and the
impact on completion schedule if any and be dated and approved by
both Owner and Contractor.
The work is to be performed in accordance with a schedule
prepared by Contractor and the structure completed by April 15,
1991 and a Temporary Certificate of Occupancy shall have been
obtained by that date. The only Item permissible to be outstanding
on the TCO is landscaping. A schedule in the general form of
Exhibit B, prepared by Contractor shall be the definitive document
for assessing whether work is or is not progressing on schedule.
The residence

was designed through the cooperative effort of
1
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Mark Walker, the Architect and Owner. Any questions pertaining to
the structure should be directed to Mark Walker or his associate,
Stan Johnson. If the architect fails to respond and such continued
failure will cause increased construction costs, Owner is to be
notified at the earliest possible moment so that he has the
opportunity to mitigate such costs. The Owner shall not be liable
for increased costs occasioned by such delays in response or
recovery from drawing or design errors where the Contractor failed
to notify Owner before the increased costs were so incurred.
The Owner will have review authority and right of refusal on
subcontracts and material purchases. The Contractor will obtain
competitive bids for services and materials in sufficient time to
permit a review of a maximum of one week duration by Owner and if
necessary, select an alternative supplier without impact on
schedule or cost. Every effort will be made by the Contractor to
locate, solicit and select suppliers sufficiently in advance of
need to prevent the forced acceptance of an uneconomic bid because
a delay would be as costly or more costly than the loss arising
from the uneconomic bid. All bids will provide sufficient detail
to permit an intelligent analysis of the value of such bid. Time
and material bids will at minimum state the proposed hourly rates
for each category of labor and the percentage of fees and all other
costs to be passed on to Owner for labor and material. Both fixed
price and T&M bids will adequately identify the materials to be
provided as to quantity, type, grade, model and manufacturer as
applicable.
The Owner's review authority notwithstanding, the Contractor
is fully responsible to Owner for the performance of
subcontractors. Accordingly, costs occasioned by the failure of a
subcontractor to perform shall not be assessable to Owner.
The Contractor shall carry insurance specifically providing for
saving Owner harmless from any action arising due to the injury of
a worker even if an employ of a subcontractor or supplier who is
not properly or adequately insured. Contractor shall, within 10
days of the date of this agreement furnish a Certificate of
Insurance prepared by the Carrier or its Authorized Agent. The
Certificate shall specifically state the purpose and limits of the
policy and these shall show that the work to be performed under
this contract is covered.
Owner specifically states and Contractor acknowledges that
Owner and only Owner is empowered to direct the Contractor to incur
cost unforeseen by the plans and specifications that are in excess
of an aggregate of $1,000 (one thousand Dollars) for any given
category. A category is defined as a class of event such as work
performed in accordance with a plan error that must be corrected,
or need to perform additional work as a result of inclement
weather, or rework directed by the City Inspector and similarly
reasonably unforseeable events. Accordingly, any costs arising
from the performance of a directive from any person whomsoever
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other than Owner which are in excess of the $1,000 aggregate per
category limit, will not be reimbursable under this agreement.
Therefore, in order for cost arising from any ordered changes or
rework to be reimbursable to Contractor, such work must be
described and authorized in writing. However, the Owner will not
unreasonably withhold approval for any proposed additional work
which may in the opinion of Architect, Contractor, Inspector,
Engineer, members of Owner's family or others be deemed necessary
or desirable.
The Contractor warrants that the residence will be free of of
defects in workmanship and materials and shall, at no expense to
Owner, correct any such defect for a period of one year from the
date of the Temporary Certificate of Occupancy. The Contractor's
liability in this regard specifically extends to consequential
damage as may occur as a direct result of such deficiency in
workmanship, and material. The Contractor's warranty liability
does not extend to work performed or materials provided by Owner or
to any consequence arrising therefrom.
Contractor takes note that Owner is concerned about the
quality of workmanship and materials and that this concern stems
from prior experience with a local contractor and ownership of
several condominiums at the Pinnacle development. Owner will not
make unreasonable demands, however, slovenly workmanship and/or
substandard materials will neither be accepted or paid for by
Owner. Owner considers that the fees he pays to Contractor are
specifically for his expertise in selecting and supervising workers
so as to avoid unacceptable and substandard workmanship and/or the
use of substandard quality materials.
Both Owner and Contractor stipulate that time is of the
essence and both will make every effort to reach the other as
expeditiously as possible. The Owner and Contractor can be
contacted as set forth in Exhibit C.
In the event Owner will not be at either of these locations,
Owner will leave or fax a schedule indicating where he can be
reached on any given day.
In the event Contractor is not available, he shall leave word
as to who is authorized to act for Contractor.
Entered into this Third Day Of July, 1990 at Park City, Utah.

CONTRACTOR
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l~ OWNER

EXHIBIT A
C H A N G E

O R D E R

In connection with the construction of the Kurzet residence on Lot
#4 Evergreen, Mountainland Builders is hereby authorized to perform
the following specific work and to supply the materials and
services as needed for such performance.
WORK DESCRIPTION

UNDERSTANDINGS
The cost differential of the above described work shall be:

The affect on schedule of the described work shall be:

APPROVALS

CONTRACTOR

DATE

OWNER
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EXHIBIT C
TO CONTACT CONTRACTOR
Office:

P.O. Box 11074
Salt Lake City, UT
84147

Richard Allen

Tel. 801-973-7888

Michael Kent

801-466-4169

Park City Mobil

645-8450..1118

Salt Lake Mobil

534-0429.. 115.8

Work Site

TBD

Jeremy Ranch

645-8449

TO CONTACT OWNER
Park City:

Tel. 645-9269
Fax 645-8622
Mobile 801-573-4453
PO Box 680670
1250 Pinnacle Drive
Park City, UT 68048

Oregon Ranch:

Tel. 503-888-9269
Fax 503-888-6055
PO Box 5039
Charleston Station
Charleston, OR 97420

Tahiti

Box Postal 21164
Papeete
French Polynesia

Direct dial
from USA

011-689-532-235

Aircraft:

Direct Dial 402-931-1124

Mobile:

801-573-4453
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ADDENDUM D
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2(3) (1993), Contractors' Bonds, Private
Contracts:
Failure of
Liability.
(3) In an
bond, the
attorneys'
These fees
action.

2.

owner to obtain payment bond

—

action for failure to obtain a
court may
award
reasonable
fees to the prevailing party.
shall be taxed as costs in the

Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (1993), Mechanics' Liens:
Attorneys' fees.
In any action brought to enforce any lien
under this chapter the successful party shall
be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys'
fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be
taxed as costs in the action.

3.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(e) (1993):
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the
judgment.
The clerk must include in any
judgment signed by him any interest on the
verdict or decision from the time it was
rendered, and the costs, if the same have been
taxed or ascertained. The clerk must, within
two days after the costs have been taxed or
ascertained, in any case where not included in
the judgment, insert the amount thereof in a
blank left in the judgment for that purpose,
and make a similar notation thereof in the
register of actions and in the judgment
docket.

4.

Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-504(1) (1993):
Written orders, judgments and decrees.
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for
the party or parties obtaining the ruling
shall within fifteen days, or within a shorter
time as the court may direct, file with the
court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in
conformity with the ruling.

